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VAGUENESS AND INDECENCY
JONATHAN WEINBERG*
I. INTRODUCTION
In April 1987, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC
or Commission) issued warnings to three radio stations for broad-
casting material that the Commission deemed indecent.' Relying
on a definition of indecency it had first announced twelve years
before, the Commission found that each of the three stations had
broadcast material describing sexual and excretory activities and or-
gans in a "patently offensive" manner.2 In one case, the offending
material consisted of a broadcast personality's comments; 3 in an-
other, it consisted of excerpts from a long-running play;4 in the
* Associate Professor, Wayne State University Law School. I am grateful to
the participants in the VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL'S Sym-
posium for encouraging me to think harder about broadcast indecency. I owe
thanks, as always, to Jessica Litman for her insightful and invaluable comments.
1. Pacifica Found. (KPFK-FM), 2 F.C.C.R. 2698, on reconsideration, 3 F.C.C.R.
930 (1987), vacated, Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C.
Cir. 1988); Regents of the Univ. (KCSB-FM), 2 F.C.C.R. 2703, on reconsideration, 3
F.C.C.R. 930 (1987), vacated, Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d
1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Infinity Broadcasting Corp. (WYSP-FM), 2 F.C.C.R. 2705, on
reconsideration, 3 F.C.C.R. 930 (1987), aff'd in part, Action for Children's Television
v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
2. Infinity Broadcasting Corp. (WYSP-FM), 3 F.C.C.R. 930 (1987), vacated in
part, Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
3. The broadcast personality was Howard Stem, whose six o'clock a.m. to ten
o'clock a.m. radio program was successful in several major markets, notwithstand-
ing charges of offensiveness and tastelessness. Infinity, 2 F.C.C.R. at 2704; see infra
notes 47-49 and accompanying text. The excerpts cited by the Commission in-
clude this one:
Stem: "Have you ever had sex with an animal?"
Caller: "No."
Stern: "Well, don't knock it. I was sodomized by Lambchop, you
know that puppet Sherri Lewis holds?"
Stem: "Baaaaah. That's where I was thinking that Sherri Lewis,
instead of like sodomizing all the people at the Academy to
get that shot on the Emmys she could've had Lambchop do
it."
Id. at 2706.
4. The play, 'jerker," was then running in Los Angeles and was broadcast at
ten o'clock p.m. on a public-radio program entitled "IMRU." Pacifica, 2 F.C.C.R at
2699. Much of the play's dialogue consisted of telephone conversations between
two gay men with AIDS discussing their sexual fantasies and experiences, some-
times in graphic terms. Id. at 2700. The Commission brushed off the licensee's
argument that the play was serious, long-running and critically acclaimed, an affir-
mation of life in the face of death. Id. It responded that "we find it hard to imag-
ine the broadcast of sexually-related language in a more patently offensive
(221)
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third, it consisted of a sexually explicit song.5 The Commission
stated that broadcasts of "patently offensive" sexually-oriented mate-
rial, if aired before midnight,6 violated a federal statute prohibiting
the broadcast of "obscene, indecent, or profane language."'7
Broadcasters, networks, program producers and public interest
groups sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit.8 They argued, among other things,
that the Commission's standard was unconstitutionally vague.9
How was a broadcaster to know, they asked, whether the FCC would
deem its treatment of sexual matters to be "patently offensive?" In
issuing the sanctions, the Commission had stated that it would
judge patent offensiveness with reference to "contemporary com-
munity standards for the broadcast medium." 10 On reconsidera-
tion, the agency had explained that the Commissioners would look
to what "an average broadcast viewer or listener" in the United
States would deem patently offensive." It was hardly clear, though,
what programming the Commissioners would think the "average"
American viewer considered "patently offensive." The Commission
insisted that one could determine whether a work was "patently of-
fensive" only on a case-by-case basis, after taking into account the
"host of variables" that made up each work's "context."' 2 This
made matters nearly hopeless for the broadcaster seeking clarity
and predictability.
manner," Infinity, 3 F.C.C.R. at 932, and referred the matter to the Justice Depart-
ment for possible criminal prosecution for obscenity. Pacifica, 2 F.C.C.R. at 2701.
5. The song, played at about ten o'clock p.m. on a college radio station, was
called "Makin' Bacon." Regents, 2 F.C.C.R. at 2703. With the chorus, "Makin' ba-
con is on my mind," the song's lyrics included the following: "Come here baby,
make it quick / Kneel down there and suck on my dick;" "Turn around baby, let
me take you from behind / Makin' bacon is on my mind;" and, "Get down baby on
your hands and knees / Take my danish and give it a squeeze." Id.
6. The Commission explained that it was illegal to air such programming
when there was a "reasonable risk that children may be in the audience." Infinity,
3 F.C.C.R. at 930. It elaborated: "12:00 midnight is our current thinking as to
when it is reasonable to expect that it is late enough to ensure that the risk of
children in the audience is minimized." Id. at 937 n.47.
7. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1988) ("Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or pro-
fane language by means of radio communication shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than two years, or both.").
8. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332, 1334 (D.C. Cir.
1988).
9. See id. at 1338.
10. Pacifica, 2 F.C.C.R. at 2699.
11. Infinity, 3 F.C.C.R_ at 933.
12. Id. at 932 (quoting FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750 (1978)).
[Vol. III: p. 221
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Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg (later Justice Ginsberg), writing
for the D.C. Circuit, rejected petitioners' vagueness challenge.1 3
FCC regulation of indecent speech, she noted, was not appearing
before the courts for the first time. In 1975, the Commission had
sanctioned the Pacifica Foundation for "indecent" programming,
and the Supreme Court had upheld that sanction.' 4 The FCC, in
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, had applied a definition of indecency
identical to the one it later used in the 1987 cases. The Supreme
Court had quoted the FCC's definition with apparent approval, and
upheld the Commission's sanction, without addressing the question
of vagueness (although the matter had been raised in an amicus
brief).' 5 Judge Ginsburg concluded that the Court had rejected
any vagueness attack sub silentio: "[I]f acceptance of the FCC's...
definition of 'indecent' as capable of surviving a vagueness chal-
lenge is not implicit in Pacifica, we have misunderstood Higher Au-
thority and welcome correction."1 6
By virtue of the Supreme Court's silence in Pacifica, and the
D.C. Circuit's acceptance of that silence as dispositive, no court
13. Action for Children's Teleuision, 852 F.2d at 1338-39.
14. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 726.
15. See Action for Children's Television, 852 F.2d at 1338 n.9.
16. Id. at 1339.
This ruling, to my mind, was questionable. The licensee in Pacifica had at-
tacked the Commission on overbreadth grounds; the Supreme Court upheld the
agency without addressing that claim either. The D.C. Circuit, though, agreed to
rule on a similar overbreadth argument in the 1987 case. As Judge Ginsburg ex-
plained, the Pacifica Court declined to address the overbreadth attack because it
had treated the FCC determination "strictly as an ad hoc ruling," id. at 1337, and
had seen its review as "limited to the question whether the Commission has the
authority to proscribe this particular broadcast." Id. at 1339 n.10 (quoting Pacifica,
438 U.S. at 742 (opinion of Stevens, J.)). The D.C. Circuit saw that approach as
inappropriate for reviewing the FCC decisions before it, because those decisions
were intended to communicate a general standard of conduct binding on all
broadcasters. Id. at 1339. As a result, the D.C. Circuit entertained petitioners'
argument that the FCC's generic definition of indecency was overbroad. Id.
By that logic, the D.C. Circuit should have considered petitioners' vagueness
challenge as well. In Pacifica, the radio station had not contested that its speech
fell within the Commission's definition; the essence of any vagueness argument
could only be that other persons, not before the Court, would be chilled from
speaking because of uncertainty as to whether the Commission would deem their
speech "indecent." Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 742; see infra note 105 and accompanying
text. That argument was functionally similar to an overbreadth claim. See, e.g.,
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965) (treating overbreadth and vagueness
interchangeably for this purpose). Because the PacificaJustices limited their analy-
sis to the precise facts before them, they could not consider such an argument.
But the D.C. Circuit, entertaining an overbreadth attack because the FCC's defini-
tion of indecency created a rule of general applicability affecting persons not
before the court, should have entertained a vagueness attack for the same reason.
Action for Children's Television, 852 F.2d at 1339.
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since then has squarely faced the question whether the FCC's defi-
nition of indecency is unconstitutionally vague. The D.C. Circuit
has relied four times on Judge Ginsburg's reasoning to avoid the
issue - in 1988, 1991 and twice in 1995.17 The Supreme Court has
now agreed to decide that question, in a case involving indecent
speech on cable television.18 The matter is problematic: It is far
from clear whether the FCC's approach to indecency satisfies the
usual First Amendment requirements of predictability and clarity.
Part I of this Article will question whether the Commission's inde-
cency doctrine exhibits the precision that First Amendment doc-
trine ordinarily requires. Part II will examine the Pacifica decision
and its treatment (or nontreatment) of the vagueness question.
Part III will suggest that the vagueness of the broadcast indecency
rule should be unsurprising: while broadcast indecency law departs
from the usual First Amendment rules both procedurally and sub-
stantively, it does so in a way typical of broadcast regulation as a
whole.
II. HowARD STERN, GERALDO RIVERA AND UNCLE BONSAI
Ordinary First Amendment doctrine teaches that government
may seek to punish bad speech only pursuant to well-defined, easy-
to-apply rules. 19 Where there are no such rules, regulators will be
able to act arbitrarily, engaging in impermissible censorship.20
17. See Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995);
Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d 105, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert.
granted, 116 S. Ct. 471 (1995); Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d
1504, 1507-08 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Action for Children's Television, 852 F.2d at 1338-39.
Cf. Information Providers' Coalition v. FCC, 928 F.2d 866, 874-76 (9th Cir. 1991)
(rejecting vagueness challenge to similar definition in FCC rule restricting "inde-
cent" telephone communication; Ninth Circuit reasoned that FCC's language had
"received the imprimatur of the Court" in Pacifica).
Judges Wald, Rogers and Tatel, dissenting from the 1995 Action for Children's
Television ruling, reluctantly acknowledged that "[b]y now, in the posture of the
current case, it is probably too late to revisit" the court's 1988 rulings on vagueness
and overbreadth. 58 F.3d at 685 (Wald, J., dissenting). Nonetheless, they stressed
that "the chill brought about by the Commission's open-textured definition of in-
decency" is "quite substantial." Id. (Wald, J., dissenting).
18. Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d 105 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert.
granted, 116 S. Ct. 471 (1995).
19. See, e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 577 (1974). See generally Frederick
Schauer, The Second-Best First Amendment, 31 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1 (1989).
20. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S.
566, 574-76 (1974); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972). A
body of law capable of arbitrary application is "inherently inconsistent with ...
valid ... regulation because such discretion has the potential for becoming a
means of suppressing a particular point of view." Heffron v. International Soc'y
for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 649 (1981).
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Speakers will censor themselves, to avoid the regulator's unpredict-
able sanction. 21 This is the source of the vagueness doctrine in the
First Amendment context:2 2 When a vagueness challenge is
brought to a rule restricting speech, the court must examine that
rule to determine whether it " 'defines boundaries sufficiently dis-
tinct' [to guide] . . . citizens, policemen, juries, and appellate
judges. ' 23 A rule regulating speech is constitutional only if it clearly
marks "the boundaries of the forbidden areas."2 4 Otherwise, it of-
fends vagueness doctrine for two reasons: First, it will cause deci-
sions whether particular speech is within the scope of the
prohibition to be decided by regulators on an ad hoc basis, inviting
arbitrary and biased enforcement.25 Second, it will lead citizens,
seeking to avoid prosecution but unsure of the prohibition's scope,
to censor their own speech, forgoing expression the law might plau-
sibly be read to permit.26
In Smith v. Goguen, thus, the Supreme Court considered the
case of one Valarie Goguen, who had worn a small version of the
U.S. flag sewn to the seat of his pants. A state court had convicted
him of violating a statute making it illegal to "treat[ ] contemptu-
ously the flag of the United States."2 7 Justice Powell, writing for the
Court, explained that because the statute was capable of restricting
protected expression, it was subject to a stringent vagueness test.2 8
The statute failed that test. It did not "draw reasonably clear lines
21. See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109.
22. Although the due process clause proscribes vagueness in any penal stat-
ute, the Constitution imposes more stringent requirements where First Amend-
ment rights are at stake. Goguen, 415 U.S. at 573 & n.10. The stricter obligation
applies in any case in which "the threat of sanctions may deter [the] exercise [of]
... First Amendment freedoms." NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-33 (1963).
The Supreme Court sometimes refers to the heightened requirement of preci-
sion in speech cases as arising under the First Amendment, see, e.g., id. at 431-38,
and sometimes as arising under the due process clause, see, e.g., Goguen, 415 U.S. at
574. When the Court describes itself as applying due process law in this context,
though, it stresses that its analysis would be more relaxed except for the fact that
the challenged law "is capable of reaching expression sheltered by the First
Amendment." Id. In this Article, I will refer to the Court's heightened vagueness
analysis for cases involving First Amendment rights as "First Amendment" vague-
ness and I will refer to the Court's more relaxed vagueness analysis in other cases,
not involving protected speech, as "due process" vagueness.
23. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 114 (quoting Chicago v. Fort, 262 N.E.2d 473, 476
(1ll. 1970)).
24. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964).
25. See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09.
26. See Baggett, 377 U.S. at 372.
27. Goguen, 415 U.S. at 568-69.
28. Id. at 581-82. The Court described itself as applying due process vague-
ness doctrine, but explained that its scrutiny was heightened because First Amend-
ment rights were at stake. Id. at 572-73; see supra note 22.
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between the kinds of [treatment of the flag] ... that are criminal
and those that are not."29 Its imprecision left enforcement to the
"personal predilections" of those enforcing the law, and thus in-
vited selective prosecution.3 0 In the absence of "any ascertainable
standard for inclusion and exclusion," law enforcers had "unfet-
tered latitude;" they were "free to react to nothing more than their
own preferences for treatment of the flag."3'
In Baggett v. Bullitt,32 the Court confronted legislation requir-
ing state employees to swear, among other things, that they were
not "subversive persons" as defined by statute - that they would
not commit, attempt, assist, advocate, advise or teach any act in-
tended to "overthrow, destroy or alter, or to assist in the overthrow,
destruction or alteration of, the constitutional form of the govern-
ment of the United States . . . by revolution, force or violence."33
The Court struck down the legislation on the ground that the
prohibitions imposed by the oath were unconstitutionally vague.3 4
The uncertain meaning, Justice White explained, would lead oath-
takers to " 'steer far wider of the unlawful zone' than if the bounda-
ries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked."3 5 Sensitive to "the
perils posed by the oath's indefinite language," they could avoid
sanction "only by restricting their conduct to that which is unques-
tionably safe. Free speech may not be so inhibited."3 6
These rules apply to the FCC, as they do to any governmental
entity. They apply with special force to the FCC, because the FCC is
a licensing body. In response to indecency violations, it can issue
fines; in extreme cases it can revoke a station's license.3 7 When a
licensing decision is bounded only by vague rules, "post hoc ratio-
nalizations ... and the use of shifting or illegitimate criteria [are]
far too easy."38 Courts may be unable to detect the regulator's "ille-
gitimate abuse of censorial power," and citizens will be "intimi-
date[d] ... into censoring their own speech."3 9 Licensing bodies in
particular, therefore, must be guided by "narrow, objective and def-
29. Goguen, 415 U.S. at 574.
30. Id. at 575.
31. Id. at 578; see, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983).
32. 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
33. Baggett, 377 U.S. at 362 (quoting WAsH. REv. CODE § 9.81.010(5) (1951)).
34. Id. at 375-80.
35. Id. at 372 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)).
36. Id.
37. 47 U.S.C. §§ 312(a), 503(b) (1988).
38. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750, 758 (1988)
(emphasis omitted).
39. Id. at 757-58.
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inite standards,"40 for government " 'discretion has the potential
for becoming a means of suppressing a particular point of view.' ",41
Against this backdrop, it is far from clear whether the FCC's
regulation of "patently offensive" speech meets the case law's test of
precision, specificity and clarity. As in Smith v. Goguen, there is no
bright line defining the categories of sexually explicit speech that
"contemporary... standards" would and would not deem "patently
offensive." Nor does reference to the "average" person lend cer-
tainty to the FCC's standard, at least as long as the Commissioners
in every case supply their own ad hocjudgments of what they think
the average person considers offensive. The Commissioners, seek-
ing to look through the eyes of the average person, have little
choice but to base their decisions on their own, perhaps changing,
views. The category of patently offensive speech thus seems suffi-
ciently unmoored that law enforcers are "free to react to nothing
more than their own preferences." 42 This invites arbitrariness in
enforcement, and seems likely to magnify the scope of suppression
by leading broadcasters to restrict their speech to "that which is un-
questionably safe."43
Given the ambiguity of its standard, the FCC might have
sought to maximize predictability in its indecency rulings by intro-
ducing some clear-cut subsidiary rules, or by seeking to limit its
analysis whether a broadcast was "patently offensive" to a short list
of factors that broadcasters could weigh in advance. The agency
did not take that course. Rather, the FCC insists that its indecency
determinations are "highly fact-specific and are necessarily made on
a case-by-case basis." 44 They are not susceptible to clear-cut rules;
they are based on "'context,' " which in turn depends on a " 'host
of variables,' 45 including the work's "relative merit."46 This, too,
contravenes First Amendment doctrine. Ordinary First Amend-
ment law limits government regulators to black-letter determina-
tions, in which results turn mechanically on a limited number of
40. Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, (1992) (quoting
Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969)).
41. Id. (quoting Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452
U.S. 640, 649 (1981)).
42. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 578 (1974).
43. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964) (footnote omitted).
44. Sagittarius Broadcasting Corp., 7 F.C.C.R. 6873, 6874 (1992).
45. Infinity Broadcasting Corp. (WYSP-FM), 3 F.C.C.R. 930, 932 (1987) (quot-
ing Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 750), aff 'd in part, Action for Children's Television
v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
46. Sagittarius, 7 F.C.C.R. at 6874.
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easily ascertainable facts. 47 For government to make a law enforce-
ment decision through the ad hoc, situationally sensitive applica-
tion of a vague policy standard, taking into account all relevant
facts, is the polar opposite of that sort of determination. 4 Such an
approach maximizes the agency's discretion and minimizes the pre-
dictability of its decision-making. 49 It ignores the concerns underly-
ing the Court's vagueness jurisprudence. Given the FCC's process,
it seems impossible that the agency could make indecency decisions
in a manner yielding the predictability and regularity that First
Amendment lawyers demand.
Indeed, it is not clear that aggressive indecency enforcement
could satisfy ordinary First Amendment doctrine. The concepts of
indecency and offensiveness seem necessarily to rely on notions of
good taste. Where good taste is at issue, though, "[i]f evenhanded
and accurate decision making is not always impossible .... it is at
least impossible in the cases that matter."50 Vagueness, thus, seems
inherent in any regulation of "offensive" sexually explicit speech.
An examination of the FCC's actual enforcement practices
tends to confirm those suspicions. The FCC has aimed much of its
enforcement fire against Howard Stem, the New York radio person-
ality. Stern hosts the top-rated morning radio show in the nation's
largest markets.5' Estimates of his daily audience range from three
million to sixteen million listeners. 52 His show is raunchy and taste-
47. See Jonathan Weinberg, Broadcasting and Speech, 81 CAL. L. REv. 1101,
1167-69 (1993).
48. See Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE LJ. 509, 536-44 (1988); Kath-
leen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term - Forward: The Justices of Rules and
Standards, 106 HARv. L. REv. 22, 58-59 (1992); Weinberg, supra note 47, at 1167-71.
49. See Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 684 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (Wald, J., dissenting):
Because the Commission insists that indecency determinations must
be made on a case-by-case basis and depend upon a multi-faceted consid-
eration of the context of allegedly indecent material, broadcasters have
next-to-no guidance in making complex judgment calls. Even an all clear
signal in one case cannot be relied upon by broadcasters 'unless both the
substance of the material they aired and the context in which it was aired
were substantially similar.' Sagittarius Broadcasting Corp., 7 F.C.C.R. at
6874. Thus, conscientious broadcasters and radio and television hosts
seeking to steer clear of indecency face the herculean task of predicting
on the basis of a series of hazy case-by-case determinations by the Com-
mission which side of the line their program will fall on.
Id.
50. Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 505 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) (discuss-
ing obscenity).
51. Seth T. Goldsami, Note, "Crucified by the FCC?" Howard Stern, the FCC, and
Selective Prosecution, 28 COLUM. J.L. & SoC. PROBS. 203, 203-04 (1995). Stem is also
the author of a best-selling book and the host of a cable television show. Id.
52. Id. at 204.
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less. By February 1994, the Commission had announced its inten-
tion to seek fines in excess of $1,675,000 against Infinity
Broadcasting, owner of stations carrying the show.
53
The agency, however, has never sought to take action against a
variety of other possible indecency targets. Most notably, the
agency has not initiated enforcement action against daytime televi-
sion talk shows. Those shows also present sexually oriented discus-
sions. One commentator presents this list of topics covered by
daytime talk shows, apparently gleaned from about a week of televi-
sion watching: a "Montel Williams" show in which a scantily dressed
guest describes how she plays "Crisco naked twister" with a motorcy-
cle gang; a "Vicki" show featuring strippers performing their rou-
tines for the television audience and a scantily dressed woman
talking about herjob cleaning houses in the nude; and a "Geraldo"
show devoted to the topic of "Sexually Assaulted Strippers."54 Such
shows often are broadcast in the late afternoon when children,
home from school, are able to watch them.55
In response to an Infinity pleading, the FCC staff once ex-
plained that a "Geraldo" broadcast discussing sexual techniques was
immune from sanction because it was not "intended to pander or
titillate and was not otherwise vulgar or lewd."56 Critics, though,
have often suggested that the producers of daytime talk shows typi-
cally do intend to pander or titillate; 57 the distinction, at least, is not
clear-cut.
In Guy Gannett Publishing Co.,58 the Commission imposed a fine
on a radio station for playing the song "Penis Envy" by the folk
group Uncle Bonsai. The singers, in clear soprano voices, begin
53. See Steven A. Lerman, Esq., 74 RR.2d 743, 746 (1994) (imposing $400,000
fine against Infinity); id. at 747 (Quello, Comm'r, dissenting) (noting that the
Commission previously had announced $1,278,750 in other fines).
54. Goldsami, supra note 51, at 239 (describing, among others, "Montel Wil-
liams: Women Motorcyclists" (Fox television broadcast, Feb. 4, 1994); "Vicki: Wo-
men in Sexy Professions" (WPIX television broadcast, Feb. 2, 1994); "Geraldo:
Sexually Assaulted Strippers" (WCBS television broadcast, Feb. 8, 1994)).
55. Goldsami, supra note 51, at 239 (noting that in New York "Geraldo" aired
at four o'clock p.m. and "Montel Williams" at five o'clock p.m.). Other daytime
talk shows, including "Donahue," "Oprah," "SallyJessy Raphael" and "Ricki Lake,"
are aired in the three o'clock p.m. to six o'clock p.m. time slot. Id. at 242 n.281.
As I write this article, WGN cable airs "Geraldo" at three o'clock p.m. EST nation-
ally and "Charles Perez" (featuring such programs as "College Student Strippers")
at five o'clock p.m. EST. The Howard Stern show, by contrast, airs from six o'clock
a.m. to ten o'clock a.m.
56. Sagittarius Broadcasting Corp., 7 F.C.C.R. 6873, 6874 (1992); see also Mel
Karmazin, 5 F.C.C.R. 7291, 7294 n.3 (1990).
57. See, e.g., Goldsami, supra note 51, at 219, 240.
58. 5 F.C.C.R. 7688 (1990).
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with the words, "If I had a penis, I'd wear it outside / In cafes and
car lots, with pomp and with pride" and finish with, "If I had a pe-
nis, I'd still be a girl / But I'd make much more money and con-
quer the world."5 9 The song contains no vulgar words except,
perhaps, the word "penis;" the singers imagine a variety of likely
and unlikely uses for one.60 I like the song a lot.
The Commission's letter opinion explained that the song fit
"squarely" within the indecency definition because it contained
"lewd references to the male genitals and to activities involving
male genitals."61 The sexual meaning of the lyrics was "ines-
capable."62 The words were "graphic" and "patently offensive."63
Assuming, arguendo, that the song was not "pandering or titil-
lating," the Commission stated, it was nonetheless indecent.64
This is a puzzle. In the context of the "Geraldo" show, the
Commission suggested that a work is not indecent if it treats sexual
matters without "pandering or titillating."65 In Guy Gannett, how-
ever, the Commission teaches that indecency is too subtle and devi-
ous to be reduced to a formula; a work may be indecent even if it is
not "pandering or titillating." What elements of context, then,
called for the finding of indecency in this case? The letter opinion
does not give much guidance. Perhaps it was relevant that the song
was played on a radio show hosted by Neil Rogers, who apparently
made a practice of on-air sexual references. 66 Perhaps someone on
the FCC enforcement staff does not like songs about penises. 67 Per-
haps songs about penises are not per se indecent, but in this case
59. See id. at 7689-90 (quoting full song).
60. Here are the song's first two stanzas:
If I had a penis, I'd wear it outside;
In cafes and car lots, with pomp and with pride.
If I had a penis, I'd pamper it proper;
I'd stay in the tub and use me as the stopper.
If I had a penis, I'd take it to parties;
Stretch it and stroke it and shove it at smarties.
I'd take it to pet shows and teach it to stay;
I'd stuff it in turkeys on Thanksgiving Day.
Id. at 7689.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Guy Gannett, 5 F.C.C.R. at 7689-90.
64. Id.
65. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
66. See Guy Gannett, 5 F.C.C.R. at 7688.
67. Cf Suzannah Andrews, She's Bare. He's Covered. Is There a Problem?, N.Y.
TIms, Nov. 1, 1992, § 2 (Magazine), at 13 (noting that movie with visible penis
draws near-automatic NG-17 rating although non-NC-17 movies commonly display
full frontal female nudity).
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the singers used the word "penis" too many times, and in too disre-
spectful a tone. But nothing in the Commission's decision yields
the sort of precision and predictability that First Amendment law-
yers normally demand before the government engages in content
regulation of speech.68 The decision suggests to broadcasters that
they should stay away from sexually oriented material entirely, so as
to avoid the guessing game whether the Commission will find a par-
ticular work, in context, to be "titillating," "lewd" or otherwise "pa-
tently offensive."
In defense of its standard, the Commission has pointed out
that its definition of indecency derives from the definition of ob-
scenity the Court approved in Miller v. California.69 That definition
too requires that the work be "patently offensive," and the Justices
by a five to four vote upheld it against the vagueness challenge. 70
The FCC argues that the term "patently offensive" is no more "un-
constitutionally vague in the indecency context.., than it [is] ...
in the obscenity context."71 If the Miller definition is sufficiently
precise, can the Pacifica definition not be?
Perhaps not. In Miller, the Court held that state laws banning
obscenity must satisfy several requirements. They must limit their
coverage to works depicting or describing "sexual conduct... spe-
cifically defined by ... state law."72 They must be limited to works
that, "taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex" 73 -
that is, that incite a "shameful or morbid" sexual response. 74 They
must be limited to works that, "taken as a whole, do not have seri-
ous literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."75 Finally, they
must be limited to works whose depictions of sexual conduct are
"patently offensive." 76 Laws meeting these requirements, Chief Jus-
tice Burger wrote, limit their scope to "hard core" materials and
68. Gannett, 5 F.C.C.R. at 7688. Guy Gannett may have been the victim of bad
lawyering. Counsel's submission, which sought to excuse the song on the ground
that it was "silly and puerile" but not indecent, 5 F.C.C.1R at 7688, probably did not
help the client's cause. Id.
69. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
70. Id. at 26-28. But cf id. at 37-44 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Paris Adult Thea-
tre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 83-93, 103 (1973) (Brennan, J., joined by Stewart &
Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
71. Infinity Broadcasting Corp. (WYSP-FM), 3 F.C.C.R. 930, 932 (1987), aff'd
in part, Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
72. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
73. Id.
74. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, 472 U.S. 491, 499 (1985).
75. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
76. Id.
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provide adequate notice to those who would traffic in them. 77 It
seems likely that the multiple prongs of the Miller definition, taken
together, define the forbidden zone more securely than does the
FCC's singular criterion that indecent material relate somehow to
sexual and excretory matters in a "patently offensive" manner.
Miller, therefore, does not close the door on the vagueness argu-
ment in the indecency context.
A more subtle argument in support of the constitutionality of
the FCC's approach posits that even if the FCC's standard would be
too vague in the context of a total ban on indecent material, it is
sufficiently precise to support the mere "channelling" of indecency
to nighttime hours.78 The argument can take two forms. In its first
form, it runs like this: While a vague standard entirely criminaliz-
ing the distribution of indecent materials would do extensive dam-
age to free speech, the damage done by a vague law's mere
channelling of indecent materials is de minimus. Such a law does
not lessen the availability of sexually explicit speech during the
Commission's nighttime "safe harbor" or in nonbroadcast media.
At worst, it shifts the broadcast of such speech from daytime televi-
sion or radio into the safe harbor, or to other media.79 Therefore,
77. Id. at 27.
78. This argument echoes a suggestion in Justice Brennan's dissenting opin-
ion in Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 73 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Bren-
nan took the position that the Miller test was too vague to support the "outright
suppression" of allegedly obscene material. Id. at 101. He hinted, though, that the
same test might be adequate if the state merely sought to regulate the distribution
of such materials to children or its obtrusive exposure to unconsenting adults. Id.
at 112-13. It is worth noting here that Commissioners Robinson and Hooks, who
shared Justice Brennan's view that the Court erred in allowing government to ban
obscenity, nonetheless joined in the Pacifica ruling. See Pacifica Found. (WBAI-
FM), 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 104 (1975) (Robinson, Comm'r, concurring), rev'd, 556 F.2d
9 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
79. In Action For Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995), peti-
tioners adopted a variant of this argument: They argued that broadcasters' uncer-
tainty as to whether particular speech would be deemed indecent required the
Commission, as a matter of constitutional law, to include "prime time" hours in the
safe harbor. Id. at 666. Otherwise, they argued, the chilling effect on speech
would be too great: Broadcasters, for example, might choose not to air dramas
and documentaries dealing with sexual harassment and AIDS as part of their
prime time programming. The court disagreed. "Whatever chilling effects may be
said to inhere in the regulation of indecent speech," it responded, "these have
existed ever since [Pacifica]." Id. The existence of a midnight safe harbor did not
"add to [broadcasters'] anxieties," for it left them better off than if there were no
safe harbor provision at all. Id.
This answer, though, does not seem responsive to petitioners' argument.
Since the start of aggressive indecency enforcement in 1987, the courts have never
allowed FCC indecency enforcement after ten o'clock p.m. Petitioners argued
that the additional chill accompanying the expansion of indecency enforcement to
the ten o'clock p.m. to midnight period would do unacceptable damage to free
[Vol. III: p. 221
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the damage to free speech is "insubstantial" under the rule of
Broadrick v. Oklahoma."0 The second form of the argument adopts a
balancing approach. It contends that even if the damage done to
free speech by the imprecision of the FCC's channelling of inde-
cent speech is more than de minimus, the government interest in
limiting the distribution of that speech to children is more weighty
and should prevail.8 '
Does either approach excuse the vagueness of the FCC's inde-
cency rule? Neither seems dispositive. It is true that the vagueness
inherent in the FCC's indecency rule does not inhibit the availabil-
ity of sexually explicit speech except in broadcast television and ra-
dio, during the daytime and in the evening before the onset of the
Commission's nighttime "safe harbor." Still, it seems hard to say
that the effect of that vagueness on the communications market-
place is so small as to be completely insubstantial. While speech in
nonbroadcast media is uncensored, broadcast television and radio
remain central in the American media universe. It would be un-
realistic to say that removing speech from radio, and relegating it to
record store bins, has no effect on its potential influence in the
marketplace of ideas. The safe harbor seems similarly insufficient.
The D.C. Circuit has ruled that Congress has the constitutional au-
speech in the broadcast medium. Id. at 666. The dissenters agreed: Broadcasters'
self-censorship, "brought about by the Commission's open-textured definition of
indecency," is expanding with the "ever-increasing reach of Commission enforce-
ment." Id. at 685 & n.1 (WaldJ., dissenting). That concern, said the dissenters, is
relevant in defining the safe harbor. Id. at 685. Whatever the answer to that claim,
it is hardly sufficient to respond that broadcasters would be worse off still with no
safe harbor whatsoever.
80. 413 U.S. 601 (1973). In Broadrick, the Supreme Court ruled that a court
should not invalidate a statute on overbreadth grounds unless its overbreadth is
"not only ... real, but substantial as well." Id. at 615. The Court ruled in Young v.
American Mini-Theatres, Inc., that the Broadrick requirement of "substantial" deter-
rent effect applied to vagueness claims. Young v. American Mini-Theatres, 427
U.S. 50, 59-60 (1976).
The plurality opinion in Pacifica cited Broadrick in declining to address over-
breadth and vagueness in connection with the Commission's rule. Its argument,
though, was that the damage to the marketplace was minimal because the expres-
sion that would be chilled - "patently offensive sexual and excretory speech" -
was of low value "at the periphery of First Amendment concern." Pacifica Found.,
438 U.S. at 743 (plurality opinion). The remaining six Justices rejected that rea-
soning. See infra notes 136-42 and accompanying text.
81. The first approach, assuming that a law regulating speech must be invali-
dated if its vagueness does more than de minimus damage to free speech, can be
characterized as categorical (or "definitional") balancing; the second, assuming
that the state interests advanced by such a law can outweigh the damage done to
free speech, can be pigeonholed as ad hoc balancing. See Melville Nimmer, The
Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theoy Applied to Libel and Misap-
plied to Privacy, 56 CAL. L. Rxv. 935, 938-48 (1968).
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thority to delay the start of the safe harbor to midnight. 2 If Con-
gress accepts that invitation, the fact that broadcasters will be able
to program freely during the safe harbor period will do little to
ameliorate the damage to First Amendment values. The exclusion
of borderline programming from the evening hours when most
Americans watch television83 (indeed, from "all hours when most
working people are awake") 84 will sharply limit the audience that
programming can reach.
The second approach is differently flawed: Its shortcoming is
that it is not the law. So far as I am aware, no court has adopted a
balancing approach to vagueness issues; governing law has always
treated vagueness as a categorical bar.85 Nor does a balancing ap-
proach seem like a good idea in this context. For First Amendment
law to tolerate substantial vagueness, so long as a judge deemed
governmental interests served by the regulation to be more impor-
tant, would eviscerate vagueness doctrine. Moreover, there is no
useful way in which a court could "balance" the damage done by
vagueness against governmental interests served by a particular
rule; the two are incommensurable. 86 Such ad hoc balancing,
compared to a categorical approach, is unpredictable, manipulable
and more likely to color results with the judge's own value
preferences. 87
82. In Action For Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995), the
court directed the FCC to limit its ban on indecent speech to the period ending at
ten o'clock p.m., but stated that Congress constitutionally could extend that pe-
riod to midnight so long as it made the extension applicable to all broadcasters.
Id. at 657.
83. In four cities studied by the FCC, the percentage of adults watching televi-
sion just after midnight averaged about eight percent. See Enforcement of Prohibi-
tions Against Broadcast Indecency, 4 F.C.C.R. 8378, 8378-94 (1989). In rural
areas, the proportion may be lower. Id.
84. Action for Children's Television, 58 F.3d at 688 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Wald, J.,
dissenting).
85. ChiefJustice Burger, at one point in Miller, takes the position that appel-
lant's vagueness argument must be rejected, for "[i]f the inability to define regu-
lated materials with ultimate, god-like precision altogether removes the power of
[government] ... to regulate, then 'hard core' pornography may be exposed with-
out limit to the juvenile, the passerby, and the consenting adult alike." Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15, 27-28 (1973). One can read this as adopting the balancing
position discussed in text, taking the position that obscenity regulation was so vital
(and the absence of obscenity regulation so unthinkable) that it outweighed any
vagueness concerns. That view, however, was never explicitly stated in Miller.
86. See generally Laurent Franz, Is the First Amendment Law? - A Reply to Professor
Mendelson, 51 CAL. L. REv. 729, 748-49 (1963) (arguing that ajudge charged with
balancing in the First Amendment context must first "measur[e] the un-
measurable" and then "compare the incomparable").
87. See Nimmer, supra note 81, at 939-48.
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At the very least, it is questionable whether the FCC's inde-
cency rule should survive vagueness challenge. It is notable that the
courts have had so little to say on the topic. In other media, the
judicial attitude to indecency regulation has seemed more hostile.
In 1974, when the Supreme Court considered a statute banning the
mailing of any "obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile arti-
cle," 88 the Court overcame vagueness problems by imposing a nar-
rowed reading on the language: It limited the law's coverage to
obscenity, reading the remaining words out of the statute.8 9 When
the Court later confronted the federal dial-a-porn statute, it held
that law's ban on indecent commercial telephone messages uncon-
stitutional. 90 By contrast, when faced with broadcast indecency in
1978, the Court was considerably more diffident, upholding the
FCC and ignoring the vagueness issue.9'
This seems odd. To understand it, it is useful to go back to
Pacifica. Perhaps a closer examination of that decision will shed
some light on the Court's approach.
III. PACIFICA
Readers of this Symposium by now should be familiar with the
facts of Pacifica: WBAI-FM in New York, on a Tuesday afternoon in
1973, broadcast a twelve-minute monologue by George Carlin,
called "Filthy Words," taken from an album that Carlin had re-
leased. 92 The monologue was broadcast as part of a call-in program
devoted that day to society's attitudes towards language. 93 Carlin
addressed "the curse words and the swear words . . . words you
couldn't say on the public . .. airwaves."94 In the course of the
discussion, he used the word "shit" (or variants) more than seventy
times and the word "fuck" (or variants) more than thirty times.95
The Commission ruled that WBAI's broadcast of the mono-
logue violated the prohibition in 18 U.S.C. § 1464 barring the
88. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1988).
89. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 110-16 (1974).
90. Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989). The Court
based its opinion on overbreadth concerns; it did not discuss vagueness. Id.
91. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. 725 (1978).
92. Pacifica Found. (WBAI-FM) 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 95 (1975), on reconsideration,
59 F.C.C.2d 892 (1976), rev'd, 566 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd, 438 U.S. 726
(1978).
93. Id. at 95-96.
94. Id. at 100.
95. See id. at 100-02 (providing transcript of Carlin's monologue).
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broadcast of "obscene, indecent and profane language."96 It
reasoned:
[T] he concept of "indecent" is intimately connected with
the exposure of children to language that describes, in
terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary
community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or
excretory activities and organs, at times of the day when
there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the
audience. 97
Applying that thinking to the facts before it, the Commission con-
cluded that Carlin's words
depict sexual and excretory activities and organs in a man-
ner patently offensive by contemporary community stan-
dards for the broadcast medium and are accordingly
"indecent" when broadcast on radio or television. These
words were broadcast at a time when children were un-
doubtedly in the audience (i.e., in the early afternoon).
Moreover, the pre-recorded language with the words re-
peated over and over was deliberately broadcast. We
therefore hold that the language as broadcast was inde-
cent and prohibited by 18 U.S.C. 1464.98
The agency did not issue a fine against Pacifica (WBAI's owner),
but stated that "this order will be associated with the station's li-
cense file" and hinted that the transgression would carry weight "in
the event that subsequent complaints are received." 99
I want to linger a bit on the practical consequences of the
FCC's action, for those consequences played an important role in
the Supreme Court's later analysis. The Court stressed that the
FCC "did not purport to engage in formal rulemaking or in the
promulgation of any regulations."'100 Rather, the FCC's order" 'was
issued in a specific factual context;' questions concerning possible
action in other contexts were expressly reserved for the future."'01
Accordingly, the Supreme Court treated the Commission's action
96. Pacifica Found., 56 F.C.C.2d at 96.
97. Id. at 98 (footnote omitted).
98. Id. at 99.
99. Id.; see Straus Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 530 F.2d 1001, 1006 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (discussing effect of such an order).
100. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 734 (1978).
101. Id. (quoting Pacifica Found., 59 F.C.C.2d 892, 893 (1976)).
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as having no consequences beyond the particular facts of the
Pacifica case.
This seems to me a mischaracterization. In Pacifica, the FCC
did not consider its decision to be a "restricted railroad ticket, good
for this day and train only."10 2 The Commission announced a rule
that would serve as a guidepost for future cases. It explained that it
was issuing its opinion in order to "clarify the standards [it] ...
utilizes tojudge 'indecent language.' ",105 It set out those standards,
stating that the concept of indecency was intimately connected with
"language that describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by
contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium, sex-
ual or excretory activities and organs, at times of the day when
there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience. 1 0 4
The Commission applied that test in evaluating the broadcast
before it, writing: " [T] he Commission concludes that words such as
'fuck,' 'shit,' 'piss,' 'motherfucker,' 'cocksucker,' 'cunt' and 'tit' de-
pict sexual and excretory activities and organs in a manner patently
offensive by contemporary community standards for the broadcast
medium" and accordingly were indecent when "broadcast at a time
when children were undoubtably in the audience," at least when
"the words [were] repeated over and over."' 0 5 The agency was not
adjudicating on an ad hoc basis, declining to say anything with fu-
ture applicability. 10 6
102. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 669 (1944) (Roberts,J., dissenting).
103. Pacifica Found., 56 F.C.C.2d at 99; see also id. at 94.
104. Id. at 98.
105. Id. at 99.
106. In one respect, the Commission's opinion was quite unclear: It was am-
biguous about the fate of offensive speech broadcast in the late evening and night-
time hours. See id. at 98-99. The rationale of the opinion suggested that material
broadcast when there was not a reasonable risk of children in the audience would
not be deemed indecent. Id. But the opinion indicated at one point that offensive
sexually explicit material would be deemed indecent at any time of day or night
unless it had serious "value;" it suggested at another point only that it was "conceiv-
abl [e]" that serious value might save speech from indecency when "the number of
children in the audience is reduced to a minimum." Id.
This lack of clarity was necessitated by the Commission's internal divisions.
Commissioners Reid and Quello believed that language like that broadcast in the
Pacifica case should be banned at any time of day or night, without regard to the
presence or absence of children in the audience. See id. at 102 (concurring state-
ment of Commissioner Reid); id. at 102-03 (concurring statement of Commis-
sioner Quello). Commissioners Robinson and Hooks, on the other hand, took the
view that the Commission had no power to regulate indecency except insofar as it
sought to protect children. See id. at 107-09 (concurring statement of Commis-
sioner Robinson). That disagreement, though, should not obscure the agency's
consensus as to the daytime hours: All agreed that during the day the FCC legiti-
mately could "protect[ ] children of impressionable age from language to which
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The FCC in Pacifica did rely to some degree on the "raised eye-
brow" - regulation through informal pressure rather than neutral
rule' 0 7 - and the discouraging hint. When broadcasters, on re-
consideration, requested a clarifying statement relating to the
broadcast of indecent words "as a part of a bona fide news or public
affairs program," the Commissioners refused to provide one, an-
swering that they "would not comment on . . . hypothetical situa-
tions."108 Rather, the FCC repeated its exhortation to broadcasters
that the "real solution" was the "exercise of licensee judgment, re-
sponsibility, and sensitivity." 109 This was hardly reassuring to broad-
casters seeking clear-cut guidelines to follow; it seemed designed to
ensure that they would "'steer far wider of the unlawful zone.' "110
Indeed, the Commission's Pacifica decisions twice cited the Yale
Broadcasting case, one of the agency's most notorious examples of
"raised eyebrow" regulation."' In the 1971 Yale Broadcasting pro-
ceeding, the FCC had sought to discourage the broadcast of rock
songs with lyrics assertedly promoting or glorifying illegal drug
use. 1 2 The agency issued a public notice declaring that it would
contravene licensee "responsibility" for a broadcaster to play a rec-
ord without a "management level executive . . . knowing the con-
tent of the lyrics," making the judgment whether the record
"promotes... illegal drug usage," and on that basis making ajudg-
ment whether playing the record would promote the public inter-
est.1 13 The Commission stressed that "when there is an epidemic of
illegal drug use - when thousands of young lives are being de-
stroyed ... the licensee should not be indifferent to the question of
whether his facilities are being used to promote the illegal use of
harmful drugs."" 4 Such indifference was inconsistent with the
they ought not to be exposed." Id. at 109 (concurring statement of Commissioner
Robinson).
107. See generally Jonathan Weinberg, Broadcasting and the Administrative Process
in Japan and the United States, 39 BuFF. L. REv. 615, 625-28 (1991).
108. Pacifica Found., 59 F.C.C.2d at 892, 892-93, rev'd, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.
1977), rev'd, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
109. Id. at 892 (quoting Pacifica Found., 56 F.C.C.2d at 99-100).
110. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964) (quoting Speiser v. Randall,
357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)).
111. Pacifica Found., 59 F.C.C.2d at 893; Pacifica Found., 56 F.C.C.2d at 99-100.
112. Yale Broadcasting v. FCC, 478 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
914 (1973).
113. Licensee Responsibility to Review Records Before Their Broadcast, 28
F.C.C.2d 409, on reconsideration, 31 F.C.C.2d 377 (1971), aff'd sub nom. Yale Broad-
casting v. FCC, 478 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 914 (1973).
114. Licensee Responsibility to Review Records Before Their Broadcast, 31
F.C.C.2d 377, 378 (1971).
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broadcaster's duties as a "public trustee... who is fully responsible
for ... operation in the public interest," and could 'jeopardize" a
broadcaster's license. 115  The FCC's instruction to broadcasters
that they could avoid sanctions if only they exercised "responsibil-
ity," in Pacifica as in Yale Broadcasting, was far from the world of
precise instructions and hard-edged rules.
Nonetheless, the Commission in Pacifica did enunciate a stan-
dard for judging indecency - "language that describes, in terms
patently offensive as measured by contemporary community stan-
dards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and
organs, at times of the day when there is a reasonable risk that chil-
dren may be in the audience" - and it was surely appropriate for
the reviewing court to consider whether the uncertainty of the for-
mulation's coverage would lead to the chilling of speech. There
was clear reason to think that it would. While the Commission's
language plainly was designed to affect future broadcaster conduct,
the scope of the prohibition was anything but crystalline. As Judge
Bazelon mused when the matter reached the D.C. Circuit, the Com-
mission's national standard for judging offensiveness seemed on
close examination to be "chimerical."' 1 6 The agency had not
sought to formulate a standard through expert testimony or polls; it
had "simply recorded its conclusion that the words were inde-
cent."' 1 7 This led Judge Bazelon to suspect that the Commission's
so-called national standard was in fact "either the composite of the
individual Commissioners' standards or what they suppose are the
national standards."" 8
When the Pacifica case came to the Supreme Court, though,
the Court upheld the FCC's action by a five to four vote. 1 9 For the
most part, the five Justices supporting the Commission were able to
unite behind a single majority opinion, written by Justice Ste-
vens. 120 At crucial points,Justice Stevens was able to get the votes of
115. Id. at 379-80. Commissioner Robert E. Lee expressed the "hope that the
action of the Commission . . . will discourage, if not eliminate the playing of
records which tend to promote and/or glorify the use of illegal drugs .... Obvi-
ously ... the licensee will exercise appropriate judgment in determining whether
the broadcasting of such records is in the public interest." Licensee Responsibility to
Review Records Before Their Broadcast, 28 F.C.C.2d at 410 (Lee, Comm'r, concurring).
Commissioner Houser agreed. Id. at 411 (Houser, Comm'r, concurring).
116. Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 23 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Bazelon, C.J.,
concurring), rev'd, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
117. Id.
118. Id. (footnotes omitted).
119. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
120. See id. at 729.
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only ChiefJustice Burger andJustice Rehnquist for his analysis; por-
tions of his opinion, therefore, represent the votes only of that plu-
rality. 121 The remaining Justices supporting the Commission -
Justices Powell and Blackmun - announced their own reasoning
in a separate opinion by Justice Powell. 122
The first key question in the Court's review of the FCC's action
was the proper scope of judicial review. 123 The majority began its
analysis by dictating that its scrutiny would be limited to the particu-
lar circumstances of the WBAI broadcast. 24 The effect of this hold-
ing was to prevent the Court from considering vagueness. The
radio station, after all, had not contested whether the Carlin mono-
logue fell within the FCC's indecency definition; it conceded that it
did. 125 The danger presented by any vagueness in the Commis-
sion's rule was that other persons would be chilled from speaking
because of uncertainty as to whether the Commission would deem
their speech indecent, and that the Commission would more easily
be able to indulge its own prejudices in deciding which other per-
sons to pursue for indecency violations. For the Court to limit its
analysis to "the question whether the Commission has the authority
to proscribe this particular broadcast"' 26 prevented any considera-
tion of those dangers.
This is curious. Courts commonly adjudicate vagueness claims
like the one Pacifica presented. 27 Why was it proper for the Pacfica
Court to limit its scrutiny? Justice Stevens briefly addressed this
question in the portion of his opinion joined by all five Justices.
The Commission's action, he reasoned, was an adjudication, not a
rule-making.' 28 The Commission had issued its order in a "specific
factual context," confining its holding to the particular facts before
it, and had declined to address questions regarding possible action
in other contexts. In consequence, Justice Stevens continued, the
Supreme Court should similarly limit its focus.'2 9 After all, the
Court reviewed 'Judgments, not ... opinions."'130
121. Id. Only Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist joined Justice Ste-
vens with respect to Parts W-A and IV-B of his opinion. Id.
122. Id. at 755-62 (Powell, J., joined by Blackmun, J., concurring in part).
123. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 734-55 (1978).
124. Id. at 735.
125. See id. at 739.
126. Id. at 742 (plurality opinion).
127. See e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 n.8 (1983).
128. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 428 U.S. 726, 734 (1978).
129. Id. at 734-75.
130. Id. at 734 (quoting Black v. Cutter Lab., 351 U.S. 292, 297 (1956)).
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This analysis - focusing on the adjudicatory nature of the
case, and its "specific factual context" - is surely understandable.
Judge Tamm, writing in support of the D.C. Circuit's contrary deci-
sion, had taken the position that the Commission's standard was
invalid because it was overbroad - that is, that there existed a sub-
stantial set of potential cases, not currently before the court, in
which application of the Commission's standard would lead to un-
constitutional results. 31 By holding that its analysis would be lim-
ited to "whether the Commission has the authority to proscribe this
particular broadcast," the court avoided overbreadth and vagueness
issues.
Nonetheless, the analysis is problematic. First, as I suggested
earlier, it mischaracterizes the Commission's action. 132 Second, on
a more basic level, the fact that the FCC was engaged in adjudica-
tion does not seem at all linked to the question whether the Court
should have worried about overbreadth. In adjudication as well as
in rule-making, broad statements by the regulator can have a chil-
ling effect on speakers not before the Court; it is that chilling effect
that triggers overbreadth concerns.1 33 Moreover, the fact that the
FCC was engaging in adjudication surely did not dispel any possible
overbreadth problems arising from the sweeping language of 18
Indeed, Justice Stevens suggested that discussion of the agency's reasoning
would be beyond the Court's Article III power. See id. at 734-35 ("However appro-
priate it may be for an adjudicatory agency to write broadly in an adjudicatory
proceeding, federal courts have never been empowered to issue advisory opin-
ions."). That was hyperbolic; the propriety of federal courts addressing hypotheti-
cal cases in order to evaluate claims of First Amendment overbreadth and
vagueness was then well-established. See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518
(1972).
131. Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 16-17 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
132. See supra notes 92-103 and accompanying text.
133. In Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, for example, the Court held that "public
figure" plaintiffs cannot invoke the common-law tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress to punish speech that would not give rise to liability for defama-
tion. 485 U.S. 46, 46 (1988). In Hustler, plaintiffJerry Falwell argued that his invo-
cation of the tort was consistent with the First Amendment, because he sought to
sanction "outrageous" speech. Id. at 50. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
Court, replied that "outrageousness" supplies no principled standard. Id. Rather,
as applied to speech, it "has an inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow
a jury to impose liability on the basis of the jurors' tastes or views, or perhaps on
the basis of their dislike of a particular expression." Id. at 55. Put another way, the
"outrageousness" standard was vague. But cf Robert Post, The Constitutional Concept
of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine
v. Falwell, 103 HAhv. L. Rav. 601, 632 (1990) (problem with "outrageousness" stan-
dard was not that it was subjective, but that "it would enable a single community to
use the authority of the state to confine speech within its own notions of
propriety").
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U.S.C. § 1464, which bans the use of "any obscene, indecent or pro-
fane language by means of radio communications." 13 4
Indeed, when it came to the vagueness issue - whether the
Commission's approach gave broadcasters adequate warning of
what speech would and would not be subject to sanctions - the
Court's emphasis that it was reviewing an adjudication rather than a
rule seems exactly backwards. Rules are more likely to give fair
warning to regulated parties and less likely to invite arbitrary en-
forcement, because the rules circumscribe the regulator's future ac-
tions. Case-by-case adjudication is problematic because it is less
constraining, except to the extent that it generates holdings that
look like hard-edged, black-letter rules - but to that extent, the
fact that the Commission is adjudicating is irrelevant.
The issue of vagueness, in the context of the Pacifica opinion,
has an Alice-in-Wonderland feel to it. First Amendment philosophy
normally requires that the government regulate speech only by
means of hard-edged, nondiscretionary rules. 135 That is what the
vagueness doctrine in First Amendment law is about: The concept
of vagueness only makes sense as an attribute of a rule regulating
speech. In Pacifica, though, the Supreme Court upheld the FCC's
sanction by insisting that the Commission had no rule; it endorsed
speech regulation by means of ad hoc, informal, case-by-case, fact-
specific adjudication. Not only did the Court not require that the
FCC apply a hard-edged, precise rule, it did not seem to require
that the agency apply any rule. Insofar as one could tell from the
plurality opinion, it was permissible for the FCC simply to make up
its speech regulation, in an unpredictable manner, as it confronted
each new "factual context." It is only a little hyperbolic to conclude
that the problem with the vagueness attack in Pacifica was that the
FCC's action, as the Justices construed it, departed so far from the
First Amendment ideal of regulation through clearly defined rules
that the concept of vagueness no longer made sense.
Is there other support for the Court's approach to vagueness in
Pacifica? The Justices did offer other arguments in their separate
opinions. Justice Stevens, in the portion of his opinion signed only
by the plurality, argued that the Court need not look beyond the
facts before it, and administer the "strong medicine"136 involved in
invalidating a statute on the basis of hypothetical fact-situations, be-
134. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1988).
135. See supra notes 19-26 and accompanying text.
136. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 743 (1978) (quoting Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973)).
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cause no important speech was at stake.' 3 7 While "the Commis-
sion's order may lead some broadcasters to censor themselves," at
worst the Commission's definition would "deter only the broadcast-
ing of patently offensive references to excretory and sexual organs
and activities," constituting low-value speech "at the periphery of
First Amendment concern."13 8 The fact that such speech might be
chilled, according to Justice Stevens, should be of little concern to
the Court.'3 9
That view, however, was confined to the three Justices in the
plurality. It was explicitly rejected by six Justices - not only by the
dissenters, but by Justices Powell and Blackmun as well. The con-
curring Justices spurned the view that the Court could limit the
scope of its analysis by judging "the value of the protected speech
that might be deterred."140 The Court, they urged, had no author-
ity to conclude that Carlin's monologue was deserving of less pro-
tection or was less valuable than other speech. 141 Instead, the
concurring Justices offered a suggestion of their own as to why it
was appropriate for the Court to limit its review to the facts before
it: Because "the Commission may be expected to proceed cau-
tiously, as it has in the past," broadcasters had no cause to fear ag-
gressive enforcement and should not feel a chill.' 42 This thinking
held up well for a while, but the prediction proved incorrect when
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. This argument echoed a statement the Court had made two years earlier
in Young v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 61 (1976). The Court in
Young rejected a vagueness attack on an ordinance regulating adult theatres. It
stated in part that
there is surely a less vital interest in the uninhibited exhibition of material
that is on the borderline between pornography and artistic expression
than in the free dissemination of ideas of social and political significance
The fact that the First Amendment protects some, though not neces-
sarily all, of that material from total suppression does not warrant the
further conclusion that an exhibitor's doubts as to whether a borderline
film may be shown in his theatre ... involves the kind of threat to the free
market in ideas and expression that justifies [overbreadth and vagueness
remedies].
Id. at 61. The precedential value of that language, however, is doubtful. Justice
Powell, who provided the fifth vote, joined the relevant portion of the majority
opinion only after stating his understanding that its conclusions did not "depend
on distinctions between protected speech." Id. at 73 n.1 (Powell,J., concurring in
judgment and portions of opinion).
140. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 761 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in judgment).
141. Id. at 761 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
142. Id. at 761 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
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the Commission sharply expanded its indecency enforcement in
1987.143
One might argue that I am making too much of the Court's
failure to discuss vagueness in Pacifica. Perhaps the Justices simply
were not paying attention to the issue, which after all was not high-
lighted in the briefs. A difficulty with that idea, though, is that the
Court, when Pacifica came before it, was excruciatingly familiar with
vagueness claims in the regulation of sexually explicit speech. In
1973, when the Court issued its five to four Miller and Paris Adult
Theatre decisions, finally ending its sixteen-year battle over the con-
stitutional status of obscenity, four dissenting Justices argued that
the Court's newly-minted standard was unconstitutional because it
was unconstitutionally vague. 144 Indeed, for three of the Justices,
vagueness was the sole ground of their dissent. 145 In 1976, when the
Court issued its five to four decision in Young v. American Mini-Thea-
tres, Inc. concerning zoning regulation of adult movie theatres, four
Justices dissented on the ground that the ordinance challenged in
that case was unconstitutionally vague. 146 Vagueness had been a
crucial battleground in the wars over sexually explicit speech; per-
haps what is most striking is that none of the nine Justices in Pacifica
thought it worth discussing.
One argument, though, remains. Justice Stevens indicated
that it was appropriate for the Court to limit its review in Pacifica
because the Justices had turned back a similar vagueness claim
eleven years earlier in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,147 a founda-
tional broadcast-regulation case.1 48 In Red Lion, the Court had up-
held the FCC's fairness doctrine and personal attack rule against
First Amendment challenge; the decision established the propriety
143. The plurality obliquely suggested that it was appropriate for the Court to
limit its review to the specific facts before it because indecency "is largely a func-
tion of context [and] cannot be adequately judged in the abstract." Pacifica, 438
U.S. at 742 (plurality opinion). The notion is an interesting one; perhaps vague-
ness is permissible in the indecency context because it is inevitable. It appears,
however, only as a hint in a single sentence in Justice Stevens' opinion. Id. It is
nowhere developed.
144. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 37-44 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing); Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 83-93, 103 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
joined by Stewart & Marshall, B., dissenting).
145. See Paris Adult Theatre , 413 U.S. at 85 n.9 (Brennan,J., joined by Stewart
& Marshall, ., dissenting).
146. Young v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 88-96 (1976) (Black-
mun, J., joined by Brennan, Stewart & Marshall, B., dissenting).
147. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
148. See Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 742-43 (plurality opinion) (discussing Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 395-96 (1969)).
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of direct FCC regulation of broadcast content. There, too, Justice
Stevens noted, the Court gave short shrift to a vagueness attack.149
It seems to me that the answer to the vagueness issue in Pacifica
begins with Justice Stevens' reference to Red Lion. The secret of
FCC indecency regulation is that it is broadcast regulation: FCC reg-
ulation of indecency departs from the usual First Amendment rules
in a way characteristic of FCC regulation of broadcasting as a whole.
IV. BROADCASTING, VAGUENESS AND THE "PUBLIC INTEREST"
So far in this article, I have marvelled at the extent to which
FCC regulation of broadcast indecency is characterized by vague
standards and situationally sensitive judgments. In ordinary First
Amendment law, that is anathema; law enforcers are expected to
rely on hard-edged rules. 150 When one takes a closer look at broad-
cast regulation, though, the vagueness of the broadcast indecency
rule begins to seem less surprising: One sees vague standards and
situationally sensitive decision-making everywhere.
As Justice Stevens points out in Pacifica, the ordinary First
Amendment requirement that law "carefully define and narrow of-
ficial discretion" does not seem to apply to FCC licensing.151
Rather, Congress and the courts have directed the FCC to govern
the electronic mass media by looking to the "public interest, con-
venience and necessity."152 The "vaguish, penumbral bounds" of
that standard leave wide discretion and require imaginative inter-
pretation. 153 They yield no predictability or protection against
bias.154
Consider the scheme by which the FCC grants licenses: The
FCC is directed to award broadcast licenses to the applicants who
would best serve the "public interest, convenience, and neces-
sity." 155 That standard is anything but clear-cut; on the contrary, it
is nearly content-free. The FCC's process of choosing among
would-be licensees, when more than one applies for a given author-
149. Id.
150. See supra notes 19-26 and accompanying text.
151. Paciica, 438 U.S. at 747 (plurality opinion) ("[A]ithough other speakers
cannot be licensed except under laws that carefully define and narrow official dis-
cretion, a broadcaster may be deprived of his license and his forum if the Commis-
sion decides that such an action would serve 'the public interest, convenience and
necessity.' ").
152. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1988).
153. FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 90-91 (1953).
154. See Weinberg, supra note 47, at 1170-71.
155. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1988).
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ization, has not been objective and definite. The agency's "inher-•
ently complex" decisional process has not lent "itself to precise
categorization or to the clear making of precedent."156 Its decisions
have rested on an extensive list of factors that the agency has been
unable to quantify or order and that have differentiated applicants
in "almost infinitely variable" ways. 157
As originally enunciated and applied by the FCC, the FCC's
licensing process was a model of situationally sensitive, ad hocjudg-
ment. The agency saw itself as reaching, in each instance, "an over-
all relative determination upon an evaluation of all factors, conflict-
ing in many cases."1 58 It sought to decide each case on the basis of
"the deposit of its experience, the disciplined feel of the expert."1 59
That was the opposite of a hard-edged, rule-bound determination.
The FCC later sought to achieve a more mechanical, objective li-
censing process, but was never able to come up with useful objec-
tive criteria for determining which broadcast applicants, if licensed,
would best serve the public interest. Except to the extent that it
abandoned the traditional comparative hearing for auctions or lot-
teries, the Commission's licensing decisions remained arbitrary,
neither consistent nor predictable. 60 The agency is currently re-
thinking its comparative criteria' 6' and has frozen its comparative
decision-making pending that review. 162
The FCC has exercised considerable discretion in its other
dealings with broadcast licensees. When it comes to the question
whether to renew a license, for example, the statute once again di-
rects the FCC to look to the "public interest, convenience and ne-
cessity."' 63 While the agency has often resisted any extensive
inquiry at this stage, the vagueness of the statutory standard has
contributed to confusion and incoherence in the Commission's ap-
proach. 164 For forty years, the FCC required broadcasters to pro-
vide a "reasonable opportunity" for the presentation of opposing
156. Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393,
393 (1965).
157. Id.
158. Johnston Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 175 F.2d 351, 357 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
159. FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 91 (1953).
160. See Weinberg, supra note 47, at 1115-20.
161. See Reexamination of the Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast
Hearings, 7 F.C.C.R. 2664 (1992), 8 F.C.C.R. 5475 (1993), 9 F.C.C.R. 2821 (1994).
162. See FCC Freezes Comparative Proceedings, 9 F.C.C.R. 1055 (1994).
163. 47 U.S.C. §§ 308, 309 (1988).
164. See generally Weinberg, supra note 47, at 1120-26.
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points of view on "controversial issues of public importance;"1 65
that doctrine too was imprecise, subjective and fact-bound in its ap-
plication. 166 The Children's Television Act of 1990 provides a small
but telling example of broadcast regulatory method: It directs the
Commission to "consider," in reviewing a television renewal appli-
cation, "the extent to which the licensee ... has served the educa-
tional and informational needs of children."1 67 The standard,
again, does not lend itself to precise and objective application. 16 8
As I indicated at the start of this article, this is odd. In the
broadcast licensing context in particular, one would have thought
that clear rules were essential. Because broadcast licenses are ex-
tremely valuable, a licensing system that allows a government
agency extensive decision-making discretion leaves licensees and
would-be licensees eager to curry favor with the agency and reluc-
tant to offend it. To that end, licensees and would-be licensees may
moderate their own speech to accord with perceived governmental
desires. Even if there is no such self-censorship, vague decision-
making standards allow the licensor to advance its own political
agenda by granting licenses to those applicants whose speech it
favors. 169
Because of the threat that government discretion may become
"'a means for suppressing a particular point of view,' "170 the
165. See Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine, 48 F.C.C.2d
1, 10-17 (1974), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. National Citizens Comm. for
Broadcasting v. FCC, 567 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 926
(1978); see also 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1988).
166. See Weinberg, supra note 47, at 1126-28.
167. 47 U.S.C. § 303b(a) (1988).
168. In the agency's initial efforts to implement the statute, it received exten-
sive filings asserting that broadcasters had served the educational and informa-
tional needs of children through such programming as "GIJoe," "TheJetsons" and
"Super Mario Brothers." See Edmund L. Andrews, Broadcasters, to Satisfy Law, Define
Cartoons as Education, N.Y. TnMEs, Sept. 30, 1992, at AI; Joe Flint, Study Slams Broad-
casters' Kids Act Compliance, BROADCASTING, Oct. 5, 1992, at 40. Five years after en-
actment, the FCC is still looking for a workable way to enforce the statutory
requirements. See Policies and Rules Concerning Children's Television Program-
ming, 10 F.C.C.R. 6308 (Apr. 7, 1995).
169. In the 1950s, for example, television applicants owning newspapers that
had endorsed Eisenhower in the preceding election were more successful in FCC
comparative licensing proceedings than were applicants owning newspapers that
had endorsed Stevenson. See Bernard Schwartz, Comparative Television and the Chan-
cellor's Foot, 47 GEO. L.J. 655, 689-94 (1959). The FCC issued its 1965 Policy State-
ment on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393 (1965), providing for a
more mechanical examination of broadcast applicants, in part as a reaction to that
news. See generally Weinberg, supra note 47, at 1115-20.
170. Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992) (quot-
ing Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 649
(1981)).
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Supreme Court has insisted that government agencies administer-
ing licensing requirements for speech be governed by" 'narrow, ob-
jective and definite standards.' 1171 If a license scheme involves the
"appraisal of facts, the exercise ofjudgment, and the formation of
an opinion by the licensing authority, the danger of censorship and
of abridgement of our precious First Amendment freedoms is too
great to be permitted."1 72 Thus, in City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer
Publishing Co.,' 73 the Supreme Court struck down an ordinance giv-
ing a government officer discretion, within the bounds of the "nec-
essary and reasonable," to grant or deny permission to place
newspaper vending machines on public sidewalks. 174 While the
permit requirement served legitimate goals, the vague regulatory
scheme made "post hoc rationalizations by the licensing official and
the use of shifting or illegitimate criteria . . .far too easy," and
could "intimidate[ ] parties into censoring their own speech."1 75 It
was particularly "threatening" because it involved a "multiple or pe-
riodic licensing requirement," ensuring that newspapers were
"under no illusion regarding the effect of the 'licensed' speech on
the ability to continue speaking in the future."1 76 Broadcast regula-
tion, though, has not seemed to follow those rules.
In that light, we need to re-evaluate the FCC's regulation of
indecent broadcasting. It is vague and imprecise, to be sure, appar-
ently in violation of ordinary First Amendment doctrine - but it
seems no more problematic from that procedural standpoint than
the rest of the body of FCC broadcast regulation. 77 Nor is that the
171. Id. at 131 (quoting Shutlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51
(1969)).
172. Id. at 2401-02 (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 305
(1940) and Southeastern Prod. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 553 (1975)).
173. 486 U.S. 750 (1988).
174. Id. at 772; see also Shuttlesworth, 394 U.S. 147 (1969) (invalidating ordi-
nance giving city discretionary control over public demonstrations); Staub v. City
of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958) (invalidating ordinance giving city discretionary
control over solicitation by dues-charging organizations); Kunz v. New York, 340
U.S. 290, 295 (1951) (invalidating ordinance giving city discretionary control over
public worship meetings); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948) (invalidating ordi-
nance giving city discretionary control over use of sound amplification devices).
175. Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 757-58.
176. Id. at 759-60.
177. One might argue that the vagueness of the FCC's indecency law is more
problematic than any vagueness in its criteria for granting licenses, on the ground
that it is more problematic to penalize people for conduct violating vague prohibi-
tions than it is to allocate benefits on the basis of vague criteria. It does not offend
anyone's sense of fairness that the Miss America Pageant chooses its winner on the
basis of vague, subjective criteria and that its choice is unpredictable; it would seem
more unfair if the pageant stripped a winner of her title on similarly unpredictable
grounds.
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only respect in which indecency regulation and the larger body of
broadcast regulation seem in step with each other, but out of step
with ordinary First Amendment law. As a matter of basic philoso-
phy, FCC indecency law is in sync with FCC broadcast regulation
generally, in a manner that leaves them both severely in tension
with ordinary First Amendment thinking.
Why do we have any public-interest licensing of broadcasters?
Why not allocate broadcast authorizations by lottery or by auction?
Why not simply allow the right to use spectrum to be bought and
sold like any other resource? Justice White's opinion in Red Lion
contains the Court's answer. 178 If the FCC did not scrutinize broad-
casters to ensure that they served the public interest, and if the FCC
did not oversee the content of broadcasters' speech, the result
would be "monopolization" of the marketplace of ideas.1 79
[S]tation owners . . . would have unfettered power to
make time available only to the highest bidders, to com-
municate only their own views on public issues, people
and candidates, and to permit on the air only those with
whom they agreed. There is no sanctuary in the First
Amendment for unlimited private censorship operating in
a medium not open to all. "Freedom of the press from
governmental interference under the First Amendment
does not sanction repression of that freedom by private
interests."180
I think that argument fails adequately to distinguish First Amendment vague-
ness concerns from due process concerns. See supra note 21. The due process
clauses of the Constitution require precision from the government only when the
government imposes some deprivation; the language of the clauses, after all, con-
fines their scope to cases in which a person is "deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty." U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The problem with
FCC indecency regulation, though, is not that it is so imprecise as to offend due
process; due process vagueness doctrine is relatively forgiving when no First
Amendment rights are at stake. See, e.g., Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455
U.S. 489, 491 (1982) (upholding, against vagueness attack, statute criminalizing
sale without license of items "designed or marketed for use with illegal ... drugs;"
the Court took the view that the statute did not restrict protected speech). Rather,
FCC indecency regulation is problematic because of the heightened vagueness re-
quirements imposed by First Amendment law. The First Amendment imposes a
requirement of precision on the government in any context in which the existence
of a vague rule is likely to chill speech or to shield government arbitrariness or bias
in the regulation of speech. A vague criminal prohibition can do that, but so can a
vague licensing criterion. FCC indecency regulation does it, but so does much else
in the broadcast regulatory arena.
178. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
179. Id. at 390.
180. Id. at 392 (quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20
(1945)).
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In order to forestall such "repression ... by private interests,"
the Red Lion opinion teaches, government must intervene in the
media marketplace to safeguard the "collective right" of the "peo-
ple as a whole."181 Regulators are to guide each licensee so that it
acts as a "proxy or fiduciary"18 2 for the larger public. To that end,
Tide III of the Communications Act directs the Commission to ask,
with respect to every licensing decision, whether licensing that ap-
plicant would serve the "public interest." Indeed, the FCC's respon-
sibility to ensure that licensees operate in the "public interest" is
repeated in more than half of the initial twenty-three sections of
that title.183
This vision of the broadcast regulatory system resonates with
(and helped shape) popular views of broadcasting. Society tends to
think of broadcasters (in particular, television broadcasters) as
speaking for the public on its behalf. Much more than newspapers,
we tend to think of broadcasters as the "public trustees" that com-
munications-law orthodoxy declares them to be. That vision,
though, presupposes a role for the "public" (that is, for govern-
ment) in supervising its media servants.
The FCC's statutorily-mandated quest for the public interest
calls for attention to broadcast content. Broadcasters, after all, have
no power to affect the public interest one way or the other, except
through the content of their programming. The FCC, thus, from
time to time, has looked directly to broadcasters' speech in making
renewal decisions. In a series of cases in the 1960s and 1970s, the
Commission explicitly based its decision not to renew a license, at
least in part, on the objectionable nature of the licensee's broad-
casts.18 4 Because licensees can serve the "public interest" only
181. Id. at 390.
182. Id. at 389.
183. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 303, 303a, 305, 307, 309-311, 315-319 (1988).
184. See United Television Co., 55 F.C.C.2d 416, 423 (1975) (denying renewal
based on licensee's broadcast of religious programming offering numbers game
picks, "special money-drawing roots" and "spiritual baths" in return for monetary
donations), aff'd sub nom. United Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 565 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1046 (1978); Star Stations, 51 F.C.C.2d 95, 107 (1975)
(denying renewal based in part on licensee's use of newscasts "as a vehicle to publi-
cize [his] preferred candidate [in a political race] - not as an exercise of news
judgment, but as a deception of the public"); Alabama Educ. Television Comm'n,
50 F.C.C.2d 461 (1975) (denying renewal based on licensee's racial discrimination
in programming and employment); Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc., 24
F.C.C.2d 18 (1970), on reconsideration, 27 F.C.C.2d 565 (1971) (denying renewal
application of station largely devoted to religious fundamentalism and views of
political right wing on grounds that licensee had violated fairness doctrine and
had, when it acquired station, deceived Commission about its intention to broad-
cast certain religious and political programming), aff'd on arguably narrower
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through their broadcasts, the FCC's obligation to ensure that licen-
sees promote the public interest made it natural for the agency to
assume a content-regulatory role.185
The Commission's Palmetto decision illustrates the philosophi-
cal underpinnings of the FCC's content regulation in general and
grounds, 473 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 922 (1973); Palmetto
Broadcasting Co., 33 F.C.C. 250 (1962) (discussed infra notes 187-200 and accom-
panying text), aff'd sub nom. Robinson v. FCC, 334 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 843 (1964); see also Trustees of the Univ. of Pa., 69 F.C.C.2d 1394 (1978)
(denying renewal to college radio station on ground that licensee inadequately
supervised station operation; listeners had complained that station had broadcast
indecent speech); Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp., 22 F.C.C.2d 459 (1970) (setting
renewal application for hearing on variety of grounds including fairness doctrine,
personal attack and political broadcasting violations), reconsideration denied, 26
F.C.C.2d 329 (1970) (licensee withdrew application); Lamar Life Broadcasting
Co., 38 F.C.C. 1143 (1965) (granting short-term renewal to station that had en-
gaged in discriminatory and one-sided programming regarding racial issues), rev'd
sub nom. United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (directing
FCC to hold evidentiary hearing on whether it should deny renewal outright);
Pacifica Found., 36 F.C.C. 147 (1964) (granting renewal after inquiring into sexu-
ally explicit programming and possible Communist affiliations).
185. In its comparative hearings, it has been rare for the FCC to consider an
applicant's past broadcast record (or proposed program service). See Random Se-
lection Lottery, 4 F.C.C.R. 2256, 2266 n.17 (1989) (describing current comparative
process). But see Simon Geller, 90 F.C.C.2d 250, 273-76 (1982), remanded on other
grounds sub nom. Committee for Community Access v. FCC, 737 F.2d 74 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (granting substantial preference for proposed programming). When those
factors are put in issue, they are "only in extraordinary cases" dispositive. Reexami-
nation of the Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 7 F.C.C.R.
2664, 2666 (1992).
Rather, the FCC in its comparative hearing process has tended to focus on
nonprogramming factors that it believes will ultimately affect content. It has
sought to favor license applicants that do not already own other media properties,
on the theory that diversity of ownership will lead to diversity of views. See Policy
Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 394 (1965) (not-
ing factors for consideration in granting broadcast licenses); see also Rules Relating
to Multiple Ownership, 22 F.C.C.2d 306 (1970) (seeking to achieve "the maximum
diversity of ownership that technology permits," and explaining that "60 different
licensees are more desirable than 50, and even ... 51 are more desirable than 50
... It might be the 51st licensee that would become the communication channel
for a solution to a severe social crisis."). The Commission has sought to favor wo-
men and minority license applicants, on the theory that a broadcasting industry in
which minorities participate will produce more "variation and diversity" than will a
more racially and ethnically homogeneous one. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,
497 U.S. 547, 577-81 (1990). That program is open to some question in light of
Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2112-13 (1995). Until recently,
the FCC sought to favor applications promising that the station's owners would
personally participate in the day-to-day operation of the station; it reasoned in part
that those broadcasters would likely show "greater sensitivity to an area's changing
needs, and [would air] programming designed to serve these needs." Policy State-
ment on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 395-96 (1965). The
D.C. Circuit in Bechtel v. FCC, however, held the FCC's reliance on that criterion
arbitrary and capricious. 10 F.3d 875, 878 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
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its indecency regulation in particular. 186 This is the only case I
know of in which the FCC's decision to deny renewal was explicitly
based, in part, on the indecency of a broadcaster's speech. 87 At-
the heart of the licensee's troubles was a radio program hosted by
one Charlie Walker. 18 8 Walker's jokes and comments were quite
racy for 1960. The following is typical:
Next Saturday it is we gonna have the big grand open-
ing over at the new W. P. Marshall store in Greasy Thrill' 89
and we gonna come over there and let it all hang out.
Course if we let it all hang out in Greeleyville, there ain't
gonna be enough room over there for nothin' else, is
there?
He says: "I believe that old dog of mine is a Baptist."
I asked him why he thought his old dog was a Baptist and
he says, "you know, Uncle Charlie, it is that he's done bap-
tized every hub cap around Ann's Drawers." 90 "You say it
is all that all the hub caps in Spring Gully is going to
Heaven?" 91
The Commission found that the licensee's broadcast of the
Walker show was "coarse, vulgar, suggestive, and susceptible of in-
decent, double meaning" and called for nonrenewal.' 92 There was
no room for difference of taste: By any standard, however weighted
for the licensee, the broadcasts were "flagrantly and patently offen-
sive."' 93 For the licensee to devote substantial time to them was
"inconsistent with the public interest and, indeed .... an intolera-
186. Palmetto Broadcasting Co., 33 F.C.C. 250 (1962), aff'd sub nom. Robin-
son v. FCC, 334 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 843 (1964).
187. Id. at 250. The Commission denied renewal on two independent
grounds. Id. One was that the licensee had broadcast material that was "coarse,
vulgar, suggestive, and susceptible of indecent, double meaning;" the other was
that the licensee had exercised inadequate control over the station and had lied to
the Commission in claiming lack of knowledge of the objectionable material. Id.
at 251. The D.C. Circuit, affirming, relied solely on the latter ground. The Com-
mission later followed the D.C. Circuit's approach in Trustees of the Univ. of Pa.,
69 F.C.C.2d 1394 (1978) (listeners complained that college radio station broadcast
indecent speech; FCC denied renewal on ground that licensee inadequately super-
vised station operation).
188. Palmetto, 33 F.C.C. at 250.
189. Id. at 278. Walker referred to the town of Greeleyville on the air as
"Greasy Thrill." Id.
190. Id. Walker referred to the town of Andrews on the air as "Ann's Draw-
ers." Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 255, 258.
193. Palmetto, 33 F.C.C. at 257.
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ble waste of the only operating broadcast facilities in the
community.
194
The Commission took seriously the licensee's contention that
the agency could not meddle in broadcast content without running
afoul of the First Amendment, and conceded that a governmental
agency could not "set itself up as a national arbiter of taste."195 The
FCC reminded the licensee, though, that the agency was "charged
with the responsibility of insuring that a broadcast licensee's opera-
tion is in the public interest. It [could] grant permits and renewals
only upon a finding that the public interest would be served by the
grant.1 96 For broadcasters to become "purveyor[s] of smut and
patent vulgarity," perverting and misusing a valuable natural re-
source, would not serve the public interest.197 For the agency to
carry out its responsibility and deny renewal "on the grounds that
the applicant's overall past programming has not been in the pub-
lic interest.., is not censorship in violation of... the First Amend-
ment."1 98 Indeed, "the greater danger to broadcasting" would lie in
the agency's shirking its role. 199
Last year, in Steven A. Lerman,200 Commissioner Quello echoed
the same theme. Infinity Broadcasting, owner of stations carrying
the Howard Stern show, sought to buy an FM radio station in
Los Angeles. 20 1 In order to do this, it needed the FCC's approval of
its petition for assignment of a license. Under the statute, the FCC
could not grant that approval except "upon finding . . . that the
public interest, convenience and necessity will be served
thereby."202 The Commission granted the assignment.203 It stated
that Infinity's indecency violations were best addressed through
monetary fines, and that the agency would not consider more
sweeping action until after completing the rule-making proceeding,
re-examining indecency enforcement, ordered in the D.C. Circuit's
Action for Children's Television III panel opinion.20 4
194. Id. at 258.
195. Id. at 257.
196. Id. at 256.
197. Id.
198. Palmetto, 33 F.C.C. at 256.
199. Id. at 257.
200. Steven A. Lerman, Esq., 74 R.R.2d 743 (1994).
201. Id. at 743.
202. 47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (1988).
203. Lerman, 74 R.R.2d at 746.
204. Id. at 745-46 (referring to Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 11
F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir. 1993), vacated, 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995)).
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Commissioner Quello, though, dissented.20 5 Noting the Com-
mission's public interest responsibilities, he wrote that it was "anti-
thetical to the public interest to authorize additional stations for
probable dissemination of gross indecency and possible obscene
broadcasts" by Howard Stern.206 "Decent responsible people," he
continued, would not likely "find it in the public interest to support
additional outlets for licensees propagating lewdness, incest, devi-
ant behavior and demeaning women, blacks and gays." 20 7
Assuming that the Stem broadcasts satisfied the Commission's
definition of indecency, why wasn't Quello right? In a fairly obvious
sense, I think he was. The text of the Communications Act, after
all, directs the FCC to be guided by the public interest in making its
licensing determinations.2 08 That is the law. It suggests that in
making licensing decisions, the FCC is required to take into ac-
count anything that bears on the public interest, and to grant, with-
hold or deny licenses based on that "public interest." Obviously,
the FCC believes that the broadcast of indecent speech disserves
the public interest, or it would not sanction people for airing it.
The licensee's broadcast of indecent speech, therefore, is relevant
to the public-interest determination. A licensee that broadcasts in-
decent speech - speech disserving the public interest - is using
its license to disserve the public interest. On that basis, one might
conclude that the Communications Act requires the agency, in every
licensing case, to consider the applicant's broadcast of indecent
speech. That, after all, is a factor the Commissioners have articu-
lated and agreed upon as relevant to the public interest.
The D.C. Circuit recently adopted that reasoning in connec-
tion with a licensee's broadcast of allegedly obscene speech. 20 9 In a
comparative renewal proceeding, the challenger had alleged that
Fifteen months earlier, the Commission had voted to allow Infinity to acquire
three other stations. Cook Inlet Radio License Partnership, 8 F.C.C.R. 2714
(1992). In that case, Infinity had promised not to broadcast the Howard Stern
show on the new stations. Id. at 2715 n.1. Chairman Sikes dissented, arguing that
Infinity's "apparent pattern of noncompliance with the indecency laws" raised a
material issue of fact regarding its fitness as a licensee. Id. at 2718. Commissioners
Quello and Barrett wrote separately; each argued that the denial of the transfer
applications would unfairly penalize the seller, a minority-owned business with an
"excellent reputation." Id. at 2720 (separate statement of Comm'r Quello); Id. at
2722 (separate statement of Comm'r Barrett).
205. Lerman, 74 R.R.2d at 746-47 (Quello, Comm'r, dissenting).
206. Id.
207. Id. at 747.
208. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
209. SeeVideo 44, 3 F.C.C.R. 757, 759 (1988), rev'd sub nom. Monroe Commu-
nications Corp. v. FCC, 900 F.2d 351 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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the incumbent licensee had shown obscene movies on a scrambled
signal.210 The Commission declined to consider the allegation; it
reasoned that obscenity complaints should be presented to the
Commission contemporaneously with the offending programming,
and not long after the fact in the context of a renewal proceed-
ing.2 1' The D.C. Circuit reversed. It noted that "[i]n awarding
broadcast licenses, the Commission is charged with considering and
promoting the public interest," and that " [o] bscene broadcasting is
proscribed by statute as contrary to the public interest."212 It con-
tinued: "[T] he fact remains that obscene broadcasts, like a number
of other factors, bear on the public interest .... The Commission
is supposed to consider the public interest in evaluating license ap-
plications."213 The agency could not simply refuse to consider a
claim "clearly bearing on the public interest."214
There is a problem with all this: That vision is seriously in ten-
sion with the way we think about speech in ordinary First Amend-
ment contexts. In other contexts, after all, government cannot
deny you the right to speak because it thinks that your speech dis-
serves the "public interest." Under ordinary First Amendment phi-
losophy, the decision whether speakers or speech advance the
"public interest" is not one for government at all; government is
specifically disabled from making that choice. Government may
not impose content restrictions simply to advance its own notions of
the "public interest."215 All the more, it may not restrict an individ-
ual's speech in the future on the ground that something he said in
the past ran contrary to the public interest.216 That, in the words of
the Supreme Court, would be "the essence of censorship." 217 Yet
210. Id. at 758-59.
211. Id. at 759.
212. Monroe, 900 F.2d at 357.
213. Id. at 358.
214. Id. The facts of Monroe differ from Palmetto or Lerman in that Monroe was
a comparative proceeding; in the other two cases, by contrast, the Commission was
considering the licensee's "basic" qualifications. No competing applicant was
before the agency. One might argue that the FCC should be more willing in the
free-for-all of a comparative proceeding to consider a licensee's broadcast of inde-
cency or obscenity than it should be to use such speech as the basis for a finding
that someone is unfit to be a licensee under any circumstances. The statutory
standard, though, is the same: whether renewal (or transfer) would serve the pub-
lic interest, convenience and necessity.
215. See, e.g., Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 685 (1959)
(striking down statute prohibiting exhibition of movies portraying "acts of sexual
immorality... as desirable, acceptable or proper patterns of behavior").
216. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); see also Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S.
181 (1985) (statutory construction).
217. Near, 283 U.S. at 713.
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that, in the indecency context, is the Commission's "public interest"
responsibility.
This tension, however, is not limited to FCC regulation of inde-
cency and obscenity. Rather, it pervades the entire broadcast regu-
latory scheme. The larger issue here is that the entire enterprise of
"public interest" regulation of broadcasting seems inconsistent with
ordinary First Amendment rules. Recall the Communications Act
philosophy set out in Red Lion: The FCC, acting on behalf of the
larger community, guards against threats posed by private speakers
to "the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, polit-
ical, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences."2 1 8 That vi-
sion is diametrically opposed to the one reflected in ordinary First
Amendment law. In ordinary First Amendment philosophy, the
"public" - in the form of government 
- is the problem. Only by
confining the government regulator to nondiscretionary, content-
neutral rules can constitutional law leave private autonomy free to
flourish, creating the marketplace of ideas. 219
I have argued elsewhere that our broadcast regulatory system
reflects a world view, and an attitude towards law, fundamentally at
odds with the world view underlying ordinary First Amendment phi-
losophy.220 That does not necessarily mean that our broadcast li-
censing scheme should be struck down as unconstitutional. It does
not seem to me that the vision underlying our broadcast regulation
is wholly wrong and that ordinary First Amendment thinking is
wholly right. Rather, the vision underlying public-interest licensing
is a legitimate one in American law and responds to real concerns.
The Commission must seek to compromise those visions even
where they are irreconcilable. As Commissioner Robinson urged in
Pacifica: "IT]here is no logical ground for compromise between
the right of free speech and the right to have public utterance lim-
ited to some outside boundary of decorum. But while the conflict-
ing claims of liberty and propriety cannot be reconciled, they can
be made to co-exist by tour de force."221 He continued: "This
agency, in my view, has the power to compel that coexistence in the
limited scale we undertake today."222
218. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
219. See Weinberg, supra note 47, at 1110-11.
220. See id. at 1171.
221. Pacifica Found. (WBAI-FM), 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 109 (1975) (Robinson,
Comm'r, concurring), on reconsideration, 56 F.C.C.2d 892 (1976), rev'd, 556 F.2d 9
(D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
222. Id.
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What is the moral of all this? It is misleading to think about
broadcast indecency regulation in isolation from the larger body of
broadcast law. Broadcast indecency regulation is not unique. Pro-
cedurally and substantively, it shares the characteristics of most
"public interest" regulation of the airwaves. It seems exceptional
because of conflicting trends at the FCC: The agency's aggressive
post-198 7 indecency enforcement has contrasted sharply with its ef-
forts otherwise to deregulate broadcasting. The FCC embraced ag-
gressive indecency regulation in the 1980s and 1990s at the same
time it embraced deregulation in other areas and successfully dis-
tanced itself from other aspects of "public interest" regulation.
223
It is inconsistent, though, for FCC lawyers to argue for deregu-
lation in all areas but this one. The fairness doctrine, the public
trustee concept and broadcast indecency regulation have the same
philosophical roots; the arguments one needs to support any of
them counsel for the others as well. By the same token, someone
seeking to argue in favor of the fairness doctrine but against inde-
cency regulation is on shaky ground. If we are to set up the FCC -
a government agency - as schoolmarm of the airwaves, we face a
heavy burden in explaining why the agency should engage in con-
tent regulation in one area but not another.
V. CONCLUSION
It seems unlikely that FCC indecency regulation could satisfy
the requirements of precision and predictability imposed by ordi-
nary First Amendment vagueness doctrine. First Amendment law
normally teaches that the government may seek to punish speech
only pursuant to well-defined, easy-to-apply rules. FCC indecency
regulation contains no such rules. There is no bright line defining
the categories of sexually explicit speech that are and are not "pa-
tently offensive." The FCC's multi-faceted, open-textured approach
to indecency maximizes the agency's discretion and minimizes the
predictability of its decision-making. Hornbook First Amendment
law allows none of this.
223. See, e.g., Deregulation of Commercial Television, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076
(1984), on reconsideration, Programming and Commercialization Policies, 104
F.C.C.2d 357 (1986), rev'd in part sub nom. Action for Children's Television v. FCC,
812 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Deregulation of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d 968 (1981),
aff'd in part sub nom. Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v.
FCC, 707 F.2d 1413 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Revision of Applications for Renewal of Li-
cense of Commercial and Noncommercial AM, FM and Television Licensees, 49
R.R.2d 740 (1981), aff'd sub nom. Black Citizens for a Fair Media v. FCC, 719 F.2d
407 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1255 (1984).
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FCC indecency regulation, though, is not unique: It departs
from First Amendment rules in the same manner as FCC regulation
of broadcasting as a whole. The FCC licensing process, and broad-
cast regulation in general, are pervasively characterized by vague
standards and situationally sensitive decision-making. The FCC li-
censing process, and broadcast regulation in general, center on the
government's obligation to ensure that broadcasters serve the "pub-
lic interest." In both respects, FCC indecency law is in sync with the
broadcast regulatory system, although sharply out of step with ordi-
nary First Amendment thinking.
The FCC has engaged in aggressive indecency enforcement at
the same time that it has embraced deregulation in other areas, and
successfully distanced itself from other aspects of public interest
regulation. Indecency regulation, though, shares its doctrinal and
philosophical roots with other facets of the agency's public interest
mission. The FCC's embrace of indecency regulation undercuts its
argument that First Amendment considerations require it to aban-
don other portions of its traditional role. Those who champion
FCC public-interest regulation, on the other hand, might do well
not to wave the First Amendment flag too fiercely in fighting inde-
cency enforcement. If the First Amendment bars the FCC from
regulating indecency, it is hard to explain why that provision else-
where allows the Commission to ensure that broadcasters operate
within the "vaguish, penumbral bounds" of the public interest.
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